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1 - Introduction 
Two interrelated ideas are developed in this essay: first, that the consequences for 
the aggregate Spanish economy of loosing the last colonies--Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines--at the end ofthe nineteenth century were relatively smal1, and that it hardly 
can be regarded, as many historians have done as the Disaster 01 J898. Second, that 
despite its smal1 overal1 direct impact on the Spanish economy, the independence wars 
fought with the colonies, and the defeat at the hands of the Americans in 1898, started a 
process of intense polítical nationalísm that resulted in the adoption of westem Europe's 
most stringent autarchy at the beginning ofthe XXth century. The colonial Disaster was 
therefore, an indirect one. Its economic consequences \vere first felt by Bentham's 
"rulíng few"--in Spain's case, the wheat, flour, and textile traders of Castile and 
Catalonia--and later reached the "subject many" by way of their influence on the 
adoption of extreme protective measures ("integral protection", as it became known by 
Spanish nationalists) facilitated by the general climate caused by the colonialloss. 
The essay is divided in five parts. After this introduction, a brief section surveys 
the commercial involvement of European countries with their colonial (or ex-colonial) 
possessions, and establishes the fact that only Spain and Portugal, and to a certain 
extent, Turkey, had a significant volume of trade--higher than ten or twelve percent of 
all exports--with their colonies. The third part of the essay analyzes the trends and 
cycles of the most important series affected by the Disaster--foreign trade, capital flo\V, 
and some sectoral indexes--to conclude that far from the disastrous impact usual1y 
assigned to the colonial losses of 1898, the independence of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines had, in fact, beneficial consequences for the Spanish economy, special1y 
through the inflow of capital that the war produced. The fourth section examines the 
losses suffered by special interest groups--Castillian wheat and flour traders, and 
Catalan textile producers--that enjoyed the colonial monopoly; and the last part focuses 
on the political impact of the Disaster and its economic consequences. 
11 - Colonial Markets in Peripheral Europe. 
Losing Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in 1898 was not Spain's major 
colonial defeat during the nineteenth century. Nine decades before, the campaigns of 
Bolívar, Sucre and San Martín led to the emancipation of Spanish South America from 
Madrid. Mexico had declared independence in 1810, and the Central American 
republics in 1823. Sucre's victory in the Ayachucho (Peru) battle against the Spanish 
royalist army in 1824, thus, put an end to three hundred years of the Spanish crown's 
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sovereignty over a territory twenty five times larger than its peninsular dominions. Fear 
of a slave revolt--as in Haiti after emancipation in the 1790s and 1800s--and the 
economic prosperity afforded by the integration into the North American market of the 
sugar plantation system, kept the Caribbean possessions loyal to Madrid. Several 
independence attempts were suffocated from the metropolis, as in the case of Cuba's 
Ten Year War of 1868-1878, but Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines remained 
under Spanish domination until the end of the 1895-1898 conflict and the American 
intervention. 1 
In any case, loosing the mainland at the beginning of the century had noticeable 
commercial consequences: between 1784/96 and 1815/20 exports to the colonies 
dropped by sixty percent, and the pre-independence share of colonial markets on a11 
Spanish exports, that accounted for over one third, was about one fifth at the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars." Colonial exports recovered to some extent after the first years of 
independence but did not keep pace with the general expansion of the Spanish foreign 
trade, this time re-oriented towards other European countries. The colonial export share 
declined through the nineteenth century to levels below ten percent after the export 
boom ofthe 1890s (figure 1). 
(insert figure 1) 
However, although most of Spain's foreign trade was redirected toward the rest of 
Europe after losing the colonial markets, exports to the remaining colonies still were an ~ 
important part of foreign sales. Sales to Cuba doubled between 1850/4 and 1885/89 and 
went up even further during the last decade of the century due to new colonial tariffs of 
the 1870s and the war supplies during the Spanish-American war. 3 Although exports to 
Puerto Rico and the Philippines also grew throughout the century, the Cuban market 
was the destination of more than ninety percent of a11 Spanish sales to the colonies, and 
acted also as an entrepót for peninsular exports to the ex-colonies on the mainland, 
specia11y during the first years after independence. 
I For a bibliographical revie'Y of Cuban history and its debates, see Antonio Santamaría García, "Evolución socio­
económica)' formación nacional", Revista de Indias, LVI, n. 207, May-August 1996, pp. 505-539. 
2Leandro Prados de la Escosura. "La pérdida del Imperio y sus consecuencias económicas" in Leandro Prados de la 
Escosura and Samuel Amaral (eds.), La independencia americana: consecuencias económicas, Madrid: Alianza, 
1993, pp. 262 and 267. 
3Jordi Maluquer de Motes, "El mercado colonial antillano en el siglo XIX", in Jordi Nadal and Gabriel Tortella 
(eds.), Agricultura comercio colonial v crecimiento económico en la España contemporánea. Barcelona: Ariel, 
1974, pp. 330-333. 
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The importance of the colonial trade for Spain is best seen in comparison to other 
European cases of commercial relations with overseas territories. One of the best known 
facts in modern European commercial history is the intense concentration of foreign 
transactions among European countries. With the notable exception of Britain, which 
always retained strong commercial links \vith its colonies, most continental economies 
were the best clients of each other in foreign trade. Nevertheless, for some European 
nations--specially those from the periphery--colonial trade was still an important part of 
their total transactions. Table 1, shows to what extent the Belgium and German exports 
to their African colonies, the Dutch sales in Java and Guyana, and even the French 
exports to their vast empire, were smaller as a percentage of total exports than the 
colonial exports of Spain and Portugal. Despite the lack of reliable data for the Turkish 
case, the available statistics also show that Turkey's integration with central and 
northern Europe was not as important as in the case of more developed economies at the 
5 
time, and that its colonies and ex-colonial territories still accounted for about fifteen 
percent ofTurkish exports at the beginning ofthe XXth century.4 
III - The Disaster's Economic Impact 
Despite the undeniable importance of colonial markets for the European backward 
metropolises, it is at least doubtful that the privileged monopolies they'enjoyed were an 
indispensable requirement for their industrialization. However, traditional colonial 
historiography--at least in the Spanish case--has adopted the Leninist interpretation of 
Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines as the last chance for Spain's industrial growth 
based on colonial markets. A good number of historians still debate the role of the last 
colonies as a leverage for acquiring the necessary market size for its manufactures, and 
consequently to what extent the Disaster of 1898 was a lost opportunity for Spain to 
join the ranks of industrial Europe.s 
The debate centers around the two traditional but basic propositions: the need for 
colonial markets as outlets for domestic manufactured output, and the colonial 
exploitation of Cuba. Although the second question is beyond the purpose of this paper, 
the performance of the Cuban economy during the second half of the nineteenth 
century in comparison to those Latin American countries that did secede from Spain at 
the end of the Napoleonic Wars seems to suggest a doubtful exploitative relation. The 
colonial governments maintained a system of relative political stability, achieved by the 
independent Latin American republics only much later in the century. In this context, 
the reciprocal comparative advantage of the US and Cuban economies led to an intense 
commercial relationship and efficient market integration based in specialization: around 
one fourth 01' all US export to Latin America went to Cuba during the XIXth century, 
and almost half of all Latin American sales in the US market were of Cuban origin.6 Per 
capita sugar consumption was growing at an annual rate of two percent in the US and 
British markets, and intensive technical and scale changes in the Cuban sugar sector led 
4 B.R. !vlitchell, !nternational Historjcal Statistics. Africa. Asia & Oceania. 1750-1988, London: McMiIlan, 1995, 
pp. 523-527 Y610-611. 
Pierre Vilar, Historia de España, Paris: Librairie Espagnole, 1974, p. 91. Jordi Maluquer de Motes, "El 
mercado..._, cit; Miquel !zard, "El comer9 catala contemporani: de la perdua del mercat colonial a I'aferrisada 
lluita per un mercat «nacional»", Ouaderns d'Historja Económica de Catalunva, XX!, Oct 1980; Luis de Llera 
and !vlilagrosa Romero, "Los intelectuales y el problema colonial" in Emilio de Diego (ed.), 1895: La guerra en 
Cuba v la España de la RestauraciÓn, Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1996. pp. 263-295; Luis Abellán, "La 
guerra de Cuba y los intelectuales", Historia 16, !!I, n. 27, July 1978, pp. 90-95. 
6 Pedro Fraile Balbin, Richard and Linda Salvucci, "El caso cubano: exportaciones e independencia" in Leandro 
Prados de la Escosura and Samuel Amaral (eds.), La independencia americana: consecuencias econÓmicas, 
Madrid: Alianza, 1993, pp. 80-85. 
6 
, to rapid gains in productivity.7 The output per sugarmill grew fifteen-fold between 1790 
and 1860, and by mid-century Cuban per capita income was among the highest in the 
world, at the same level as those of Europe's advanced economies.8 In any case, the 
"iniquitous colonial relationship between Cuba and the metropolis"9 gave place on the 
island to a substantial1y more prosperous economy--at least 30 percent higher in income 
per capita terms--than in Spain. 10 
With respect to the need of the colonies for industrialization, the rationale is the 
indispensable role played by captive colonial markets for metropolitan exports. In the 
Spanish case, the 1898 War translated into a drastic short-run reduction of exports to the 
Cuban protected market, but, as shown below, total Spanish exports were basical1y 
unaltered. As will be evident later, a substantial amount of the volume of total exports 
to Cuba was redirected to alternative areas of Latin America and Europe, and although 
they remained low relative to pre-1898 levels up to 1914, exports to Cuba started to 
recover soon after the First World War, and by the interwar years reached levels similar 
to those previous to the export boom of the 1870s. 11 In addition, the sales of sen'ices to 
the island remained almost unaltered. In contrast with the first experience of colonial 
independence, when Spain lost two thirds of its sales in transport, insurance and 
financial services,12 Spanish shipping companies remained very active in the island's 
trade, and most of the merchant firms and property owned by Spaniards in Cuba was 
practical1y unaffected by independence in 1898. 13 Furthermore, unlike the sixty percent 
drop after the first wave of colonial seccession in the 1820s, I~ custom revenues went up 
7 Antonio Santamaría Garcia, "Caña d.: azúcar y producción d.: azúcar en Cuba. Crecimiento y organización de la 
industría azucarera cubana desde mediados dd siglo XIX hasta la finalización d.: la Primera Guerra t\lundial", in 
Consuelo Naranjo, Miguel Angel Puig Samper and José Luis García Mora (eds.), La nación soñada: Cuba. 
Puerto Rico \' Filjpinas ante el 98, Aranjuez: Editorial Doce Calles, 1996. pp. 225-250. Also see, Alan Dye. 
"Producción en masa del azúcar cubano, 1899-1929: economías de escala y elección de técnicas", Revista d.: 
Historia Econ,ómjca, XI, n. 3, 1993, pp. 563-593. 
8 P. Fraile and R. and L. Salvucci, "El caso cubano..." cit, pp. 9-t-101. 
9 Thomas Hart Baker Jr., "Imperial Finale: Crisis, Decolonization, and \\'ar in Spain, 1890-1898", Doctoral 
Dissertation, Department of History, Princeton University, No\'ember 1976, p. 148. 
10 P. Fraile and R, and L. Salvucci, "El caso cubano..." cit, p. 101 and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, "Spain's Gross 
Domestic Product, 1850-1993: Quantitative Conjectures. Appendix", "'orking Paper n. 95-06, Universidad 
Carlos III de Madrid, February 1995, p. 197. Neither Spanish nor American domination after independencc 
seemed to have harmed Cuban interests or those of the Spaniards living on the island. Most lands remained in 
Spanish hands after independence, and the Reciprocity Treaty of 1903 gave the island's cane gro",ers freer 
access to the US sugar market, and more revenues from it. S. Levergott concludes: "The prime economic 
beneficiaries of the Spanish-American \\'ar, in sum, ",ere Spaniards and Cubans ",ho o",ned Cuban sugar land at 
the start of the "'ar." See, Stanley Lebergott, "The Returns to U.S. Imperialism, 1890-1929", The Journal of 
Economic HjstoD', XL, n. 2, June 1980, p.303. 
11 Antonio Tena, "Comercio exterior", in Albert Carreras (ed.). Estadísticas históricas de España. Si&los XIX-XX, 
Madrid: Fundación Banco Exterior, 1989, pp. 346-347 and 356. 
12 L. Prados de la Escosura, "La pérdida.." cit, p. 262. 
13 Alejandro García Ah'arez, "Presencia española en el comercio cubano", Estudios de Historia Social, 1988, nos. 
44/47, pp. 605-613.
 
14 L. Prados de la Escosura, "La pérdida.." cit, p. 270.
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by more than one third between 1880/1900 and 1900/1910. 15 Migration flo\\'s to Cuba 
doubled after independence,16 and this helped not only the gro\vth of migrants_ 
remittances,17 but also to increase and diversify Spanish exports--specia11y food 
products--to the ex-colony. 
It is doubtful, therefore, that the loss of this colonial market seriously 
jeopardized Spain's chances for industrial growth. In the rest of this section, a more 
rigorous assessment is developed of the real impact on the aggregate Spanish economy 
of loosing Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in 1898. We propose to do this by 
searching for unusual years (outliers) or abnonnal periods (structural breaks) using 
time series methods. We apply those techniques to several aggregate economic 
variables like foreign trade, capital flo\\' and several sectoral indexes from the year 1859 
to 1914. 
Our goal is to isolate "unusual" or unstable periods in several economlC 
variables during the years 1850 to 1914. A basic condition for aggregate data to support 
the hypothesis of the existence of a "Spanish 1898 Disaster" is that the time series 
analysis of the data should be able to identify the period around 1898 as an "unusual" or 
unstable period, creating structural breaks in the parameters of constant parameter 
models built over the fu11 sample periodo Fol' that purpose \ve use recent time series 
techniques de\'eloped and implemented by Gómez and Marava11 18 • 
In particular, \\'e consider that a certain year is "unusual" if the observation 
corresponding to that year is an "outlier" or ifthat year is affected by previous outliers. 
Let oz(t) be a particular economic time series variable observed at time t, for 
example OEXPORTS at time t, \vhere t = 1850, ... ,1914 and let z(t) be the same time 
series variable but corrected for the unusual events (outliers), EXPORTS. Therefore the 
relationship between the t\\'o variables is, 
oz(t) = outlier(t) + z(t) (1) 
If the outlier(t) component is equal to O for a11 time t, where t = 1850, ... , 1914, 
this means that during this period there has been no structural change in the oz(t) 
variable. If on the contrary, the outlier(t) component is different than O for some t we 
then check if among those unusual years is the year 1898 or its near future. Four 
15 Francisco Comín Comín, Fuentes cuantitativas para el estudio del sector público en España 1801-1980, Madrid: 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, monografía n. 40, 1985, pp. 72-73. 
16 Blanca Sánchez Alonso. Las causas de la emigración española. 1880-1930, t"ladrid: Alianza, 1995, pp. 281-282. 
17 José Ramón Garcia López. 1 as remesas de los emigrantes españoles en América. Siglos XIX v XX, Gijón: JÚcar. 
1992. 
18 The theory is explained in Gómez V. and A. Maravall (1994) "Estimation, prediction and interpolation for 
nonstationary series \\'ith the Kalman fílter", Journal ofthe American Stntistical Associntion 89, 611-624. and in 
t"laravall A. (1988) "The use of ARIMA models in unobserved components estimation" in Sarnett, \V., Berndt, E. 
and White 1-1. (eds.), Dynamic Econometric Modeling, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
B 
different types of outliers are considered for each economic variables: i1U10vation 
outliers (10), additive outliers (AO), temporal changes (TC) and level shifts (LSY9. 
The basic idea of our methodology is the following: if the impact of loosing 
Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the so called "Spanish 1898 Disaster", affected 
aggregate economic variables \Ve should be able to identify several outliers from 1898 
and after. Otherwise, since we know that important events occurred, and this is not 
reflected on aggregated economic variables, it must be because all of these real effects 
washed out on the aggregate through reallocation of resources among different sectors 
of the economy (distributional effects among different sectors) or among different 
countries (trade). On the contrary, when an outlier is detected for a certain year T \Ve 
would like to have a methodology that can provide us with a qllantifative meaSllre ofthe 
temporal e.ffects: Ho\\' long (dllration) does the impact last ? Ho\\' large (size) is the 
quantitative effect on the economic variable ? In appendix A, we give a brief 
introduction to the econometric methodology used in the empirical analysis. 
The economic variables selected for this quantitative study of the aggregate 
effects of" 1898" are the following"°: observed export series (OEXPORT) from 1850 to 
1914, observed real gross domestic product per capita (ORGDPPOP) from 1850 to 
1914, observed index of bank deposits (OBANKING) from 1850 to 1914, observed 
current account balances (OCCBAL) from 1851 to 1914, current account +/- reserve 
variations (CCBALM) from 1857 to 1914, manufacturing index of food products 
(FOOD) from 1850 to 1914 and manufacturing index of textile products (OTEXTILES) 
from 1850 to 1914. 
Table 2 includes the time series (ARIMA) models estimated for the outlier 
corrected variable z(t). When certain types of outliers are detected in oz(t) from 1850 to 
1914 this is reported in the table with the corresponding t-test of significance (t-ratio). 
In most ofthe cases analyzed in the paper, the absolute values ofthe t-ratios are ahvays 
larger than the 1% or 5% critical values, and in those cases \Ve al\Vays reject the null 
hypothesis that w=O in favor of the alternative hypothesis of having detected an outlier 
(w::¡tO). When \Ve do not report the t-ratio of w, like for the variables CCBALM and 
FOOD, it is because we could not identify any outlier effect on that variable (w=O). 
19 See appendix A for a detailed explanation of the estimated models, a ddinition of eaeh type of outlier and the 
unobserved eomponents model deeomposition (trend, eycle, etc.).
 
10 See appendix B for an explanation of the terminology used for the analysis of eaeh variable and for a detailed
 
definition of the data used.
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Additive Outlier (AO): outlier(T) = w It(T) 
Temporal Change (TC): outlier(T) = w {ti 0.7M It(T) 
oz(t) =outlier(t)+ z(t) 
where z(t) is AR(p) MA(q) 
~(B) ~{z(t)- ~ } = ~(B) e(B) Type of outliers Misspecilication 
e(B) a(t) coeffs. coeflicients. detected detected* 
OEXPORTS variable (1850-1914) 
el = -0.23 Year = 1914 
ARIMA(0,1,2)** t-ratio= (-1.85) Type = Additive outlier none 
~ = 18.86 e2 = -0.32 w = -543 
t-ratio = (4.13) t-ratio= (-2.42) t-ratio(w) = (-6.88) 
ORGDPPOP variable (1850-1914) 
Year= 1872 
Type = Temporal change 
el = 0.15 w = 10776 
ARI:VIA(O, 1,1) t-ratio= (-1.27) t-ratio(w) = (4.11) 
Year=1911 none 
Type = Temporal change 
w = 11953 
t-ratio(w) = (4.53) 
OBANKING variable (1850-1914) 
Year = 1898 
ARli\IA(O,I, 1) el = -0.16 Type = Temporal change 
~l = 0.10 t-ratio = (-1.33) w = 2.05 none 
t-ratio = (3.09) t-ratio(w) = (6.86) 
OCCBAL variable (1851-1914) 
Year = 1899 
ARli\1A(0, I,l) el = -0.73 Type = Temporal change none 
t-ratio = (-8.60) w = 547 
t-ratio(w) = (3.94) 
CCBALM variable (1857-1914) 
ARIMA(O, 1,1) el = -0.56 none none
 
t-ratio = (-5.10)
 
FOOD variable (1850-1914)
 
ARIMA(O,I, 1) el = -0.40 
~=O.72 t-ratio = (-3.46) none none 
t-ratio = (2.15) 
OTEXTlLES variable (1850-1914) 
Year = 1907 
Type = Additive outlier 
ARIMA(O, 1,1) el =0.06 w = 6.13 
~ = 0.79 t-ratio = (0.47) t-ratio(w) = (4.71) none 
t-ratio = (3.13) Year = 1914 
Type = Additive outlier 
w = 7.27 
t-ratio(w) = (3.80) 
* The misspecification analysis done corresponds to: Norma/it)' test of the errors, the alltocorre/ogram
 
and pal'tia/ autocorre/ogram ofthe residuals and a test Ofl'III1S on the residuals.
 
** See appendix A for a deeper explanation of the parameters estimated and the type of outliers
 
detected.
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All the series we are considering are nonstationary (with unit roots) and ,,"e 
therefore take first differences to make them stationary (no more unit roots). None of 
the autoregressive coefficients (AR) are significant in the estimated ARIMA models. 
The maximum moving average found was an MA(2) when modelling the first 
difference of the exports variable (OEXPORT). The variables OCCBAL, CCBALM 
and FOOD of Table 2, have significant moving average polynomials of order 1 
(MA(1)). The first difference of ORGDPPOP, OBANKING and OTEXTILES have 
MA(1) coefficients \Vhich are not significant (white noise). In none of the models \Ve 
were able to identify any type ofmisspecification (see bottom ofTable 2 for details). 
(insert Figure 2a) 
Only two of the four t)'pes of outliers are detected in the seven variables 
analyzed in Table 2: additive ol/tUer (AO) and temporal change (TC), see appendix A. 
During the ,,"hole sample period, 1850 to 1914, several "unusual years" are found and 
the follo\Ving outliers ,,"ere detected for at least one of the seven series, 1872, 1898, 
1899,1907,1911 and 1914. Among those dates the years 1898 and 1899 correspond to 
our period of interest. However, those t""O years influenced onl)' t""O of the seven 
aggregated economic variables analyzed, OBANKING and OCCBAL, but not the rest 
ofthem. 
(insert Figure 2b) 
In the observed index of bank deposits (OBANKING) the instantaneous impact 
of 1898 \vas egual to 2.05 million pesetas, \\"ith a significant t-ratio of 6.86 (see Table 
2). The total impact until 1914 \Vas 6.80 million pesetas and coincides with the shaded 
area, indicated in figure 2a of appendix C, when \Ve compare the evolution of the 
variable OBANKING with that variable corrected for outliers (BANKING) from 1898 
to 1914. The temporal profile of this impact is represented in figure 2b. It is clear that 
those effects are transitory with a decreasing impact. In fact, even though the effects last 
until 1914 the main duration of the 1898 impact lasted eight years, from 1898 to 1906, 
and it is evaluated in 6.48 millions of pesetas which represents 95% of the total impact, 
see Table 3 and figure 2b. This variable OBANKING can be decomposed in terms of 
the unobserved components, the trend (BANKINT) and the irregular component 
(BANKINGI) and those are represented in figures 3a and 3b. Clearly, since the outlier 
11 
is of a temporal change (TC) type it is associated with the irregular component and not 
\vith the trend that would only include perrnanent changes. 
1907 0.0825436 1907 31.533856 
1908 0.0577805 1908 22.073699 
1909 0.0~04463 1909 15.451589 
1910 0.0283124 1910 10.816113 
1911 0.0198187 1911 7.5712788 
1912 0.0138731 1912 5.2998951 
1913 0.0097112 1913 3.7099266 
1914 0.0067978 1914 2.5969486 
PERIOD TOTAL PERlaD TOTAL 
1898-1914 6.80 1899-1914 1817.30 
1898-1906 6.48 1899-1906 1718.24 
* The out1iers are ofthe temporal change (TC) type.
 
** The years of this shaded area correspond to the shaded area of figures 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b.
 
*** The vears of this shaded area corres ond to the shaded area of figures 4a. 4b, 5a and 5b.
 
(insert figures 3a and 3b) 
In tenns ofthe observed current account balances (OCCBAL) the instantaneous 
impact of 1899 \Vas equal to 547 million pesetas, with a significant t-ratio of 3.94 (see 
Table 2). The total impact until 1914 was 1817.30 millions ofpesetas and corresponds 
to the area between the two series of figure 4a from 1899 to 1914 and the shaded aerea 
of figure 3b. The temporal profile (TC) is represented in figure 4b. 
(insert figures 4a and 4b) 
Once again, the impact of 1899 is transitory and decreasing in time with the 
mayor effects finishing in 1906. Those effects are quantified as 1718.24 million pesetas 
and represents 95% ofthe total effect until1914 (see Table 3 and figure 4b). 
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(insert Figures 5a and 5b) 
The unobserved components of OCCBAL are represented in Figure 5a and 5b, 
respectively. The trend component (CCBALT) of Figure 5a has no clear tendency to 
grow and this is consistent with having an MA(1) with coefficient of -0.7 indicating that 
this series is close to stationary without taking first differences. The temporal change 
found is therefore added to the irregular component (CCBALI) in Figure 5b. 
(insert Figures 6a and 6b) 
Finally, since the export variable is one of the most relevant one to analyze the 
aggregate impact of the "1898 disaster" on trade, \Ve have completed a full analysis of 
this variable. In Figures 6a and 6b \Ve represent the observed series and the additive 
outlier (AO) detected in 1914, respectivel)'. Since Figure 6b is almost empty this means 
that there was no aggregate effect until 1914, which is the last year of the sample 
analyzed. The unobserved components decomposition in trend (EXPORTT), business 
cycle (EXPORTC) and irregular (EXPORTI) are represented in Figures 7a to 7c. 
Clearly the largest impact of the year 1898 and after, occurred in the cyclical 
component, but does not imply any structural change in the parameters of this 
component. Notice that it is the irregular component the one that was associated with 
the outlier found in 1914. 
(insert Figures 7a, 7b and 7c) 
IV - The Sectoral Effects of the Disaster. 
Although the overall effect of colonial independence was not really a disaster for 
Spain, and despite the fact that it even had positive consequences for the ex-metropolis, 
the 1898 events did not leave Spain's industry and trade unaffected. To begin with, the 
assesment carried out in the previous section has not included the analysis of certain 
variables whose changes could have had direct and indirect, instant and lagged effects 
on the overall economic system. This is the case, for example, of the sharp depreciation 
of the Spanish exchange rate, and the increase in public expenditure and deficits of the 
1895-1898 war/ I and even the previous independence attempt of 1868-187822• But even 
21 Jordi Maluquer de Motes, "La financiación de las guerras)' la economía española (1895-1898)", paper prsented to 
the V Encuentro de Americanistas. El fin de un Imperio: Balance económico. Universidad de Oviedo, Noviembre 
[996.
 
22 Francisco Comín Comin, Hacienda \' economía en la España contemporánea (J 800-1936), Madrid: Instituto de
 
Estudios Fiscales, 1988, vol. [, p. 338; Gabriel Tortella Casares, Los orí¡¡:enes del capitalismo en España. Banca.
 
industria \' ferrocarriles en el si¡¡:lo XIX, Madrid: Tecnos, [973, pp. [98-199.
 
13 
more important, the previous aggregate analysis did not take into account the specific 
effects that the colonial link, and its rupture, could have had on concrete sectors of the 
economy whose connection with the colonial trade was special1y intense. 
As in most colonial cases, the commercial relations between Spain and Cuba were 
dominated by a few sectors that concentrated most of the transactions between the 
metropolis and her colonies, and benefited most from the captive Cuban markets. From 
mid-nineteenth century on, four groups of products--flour, cotton textiles, shoes and 
wine--represented between one half and two thirds of al1 Spanish sales to the island, and 
in the two decades preceding independence, exports of flour and cotton textiles 
accounted for almost a third of the tota1.23 It was in these activities that sorne industrial 
capital was accumulated, and where the dynamic effects of colonial trade were to be 
felt. As in most cases of colonial relations, the special interests of these sectors 
organized powerful lobbies that played a decisive role in shaping the overall colonial 
polic)'. 
At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the old mercantilist policy of commercial 
exclusion for non-Spanish trade, was relaxed to some extent. But the 1847 tariff again 
tightened protection for metropolitan exports. Differential rates in favor of Spanish 
products \vere increased again in 1870 and 1872, and under the Commercial RelatioJ1s 
Act of 1882. Ho\vever, that same year, an agreement was signed with the U.S.A. to 
accord preferential tariff treatment to American flour on the island in exchange for 
easier access of the colonial ingenios to the United States sugar market. From that 
moment on, exports of Spanish flour dwindled to almost nothing at the time of 
independence. Cotton textiles, on the other hand, continued to dominate colonial 
markets, and even though the loss of the colonies translated into an export crisis, this 
was only temporary. Exports to the rest of Latin America and Europe more than 
compensated for the Cuban market for at least one more decade after independence.24 
Flour exporters and wheat growers were located on the northern plateau of 
Castil1e, and used the port of Santander on the Bay of Biscay as their main connection 
with Cuba. The Caribbean trade made Santander the second merchant port in Spain by 
mid-century, special1y after the completion of the Castil1e Canal (1852) and a railroad 
(1859) that linked the northern coast to the wheat growing plains of north-central 
Spain.25 Between 1780 and 1860 about one hundred and fifty flour mills were installed 
23 J. t\laluquer, _El mercado..._. cit., pp. 340-341. 
24 Caries Sudria, "La exportación en el desarrollo de la industria algodonera española, 1875-1920", Revista de 
Historia Económica. \, n. 2, \983, pp. 384-385. 
25 Andrés Hoyo Aparicio. Todo mudó de repente. El horizonte económico de la burguesía mercantil en Santander. 
1820-\874. Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 1993; Tomás Martínez Vara, "Aproximación al comercio 
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along this transportation route, aH of them engaged in the protected Cuban market. 
Large trading firms, aH of them managed by local merchant families, developed and 
diversified around Santander and sorne Castillian towns. This was the case of the 
Pombos, whose assets reached from milling into sailing, railroads, banking, textiles, and 
food processing,26 and the López-Dórigas (later Botín) who are now one Spain's oldest 
entrepreneurial families. They also started as colonial traders but later became involved 
in steel mills, utilities, electricity, engineering, mining, sailing and banking (Banco 
Santander).27 Like Pombo and Botín, other family groups--Illera, Huidobro, Hornedo, 
Gallo--formed an extensive and teclmically advanced network associated with milling 
and flour exports to the protected Caribbean market.28 
Cotton textiles were heavily concentrated around Barcelona in Catalonia, and had 
developed behind high tariff wal1s from the last decades of the XVIII century. Unlike 
flour, cotton textile exports started late, after the 1882 tariff reform that reserved the 
colonial market for peninsular producers. However, they became the leading export 
merchandise from the metropolis after American \\'heat \vas awarded free entry in 1882. 
In any case, the reaction to Ihe Disasler was very different in both sectors. The 
independence of the last Spanish colonies meant the loss of protected markets and the 
need to find alternative outlets for their products. This \Vas difficult for Castilian \\'heat 
growers and flour millers whose total exports after Cuban independence practically 
disappeared due to the competition of American suppliers. But most Castilian 
merchants diversified their firms into food processing, textiles, coal mining, 
construction, electricity and banking.29 Catalan textile producers, on the other hand, 
fared much better in the new open market (figure 8). They found alternative foreign 
outlets for their exports, and it was not until extreme tariff protection of the home 
market made domestic sales more profitable--and competition abroad unnecessary--that 
Spanish textile exports \Vere substituted by domestic sales. 3D 
marítimo de Santander en los siglos XVII\ y XIX" in Tomás tvlartinez Vara (ed.), Mercado \. desarrollo econÓmico 
en la España contemporánea, Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1986, pp. 175-203; and"EI comercio de Santander en los siglos 
XVII\ y XIX. Notas para su estudio", in Miguel Angel Pesquera (ed.), Santander. El puerto \. su historia. 
Bicentenario del Consulado del Mar. 1785-1985, Santander: Junta del Puerto, 1985, pp. 73-96. 
26 Javier tvloreno Lázaro, "Empresa, burguesía)' crecimiento económico en Castilla la Vieja en el siglo XIX: los 
Pombo; una historia empresarial", Anales de Estudios EconÓmicos \. Empresariales, 1994, n. 9, pp. 333-356. 
27 Javier Moreno Lázaro, "Los López Dóriga: historia de una saga empresarial santanderina. 1770-1914", V 
Congreso de la Asociación de Historia Económica, (Proceedings), San Sebastian, 29-30 September, 1993, pp. 
168-190. 
28 For an analysis of technological change in the Castillian milIs, see Javier Moreno Lázaro, "Crisis )' 
transformación de la harinería en Castilla y León (1882-1905)", Cuadernos de Economía de Castilla v León. 1, 
1992, pp. 163-229. 
29 Ibid; Andrés Hoyo Aparicio, Todo mudó..., cit, pp. 237-277. 
30 Despite their small size, the sucessfull performance of Spanish textile exports in open, post-colonial markets, is 
specialy relevant in view of the acritical aceptance by many economic historians of the Spanish manufacturers' 
15 
(insert Figure 8 here) 
In surnrnary, for a complete analysis of the impact of Empire--first having it and 
then loosing it--the global results presented in section III need to be taken in connection 
with their sectoral consequences. A doser look at the post-1898 events reveals that the 
loss of the last colonies had, indeed, a disastrous effect on the Spanish econorny, and 
that traditional historians are, after aH, right in assessing its consequences as a Disaster. 
The adverse effects, however, were not due to the loss of the colonial markets, but 
rather to the institutional changes the colonial independence brought about in Spain. 
However right about the Disaster, it is likely that they have put too much emphasis on 
the traditional (positive) dynarnic effects of protected markets--capital accurnulation, 
technical change, economies of scale, learning by doing--while ignoring their negative, 
also dynarnic, consequences. Captive colonial markets, as in any case of trade 
restriction, might have helped the accumulation of Spanish manufacturing capital in 
some sectors, like flour milling and cotton textiles. From the end of the XIX century to 
the Great Depression, output of Castillian wheat and flour and Catalan textiles 
expanded substantially, and it is likely that the increase \vas helped by the initial 
exploitation of the captive Cuban market. But it is at least doubtful that the resen'ed 
colonial market could have been the basis for successful industrialization in Spain. One 
of the dynamic effects of protection is increasing output in the short run, but another, 
seldom ignored dynamic effect, is the opportunity for output restriction that protection 
affords by eliminating foreign competition in smaH national markets. Spain's gradual 
deindustrialization (relative to other European economies) in the context of Europe's 
highest trade barrier seems to suggest that this was exactly the case. 31 In addition, the 
colonial character of the markets lost in 1898 by Spanish exporters had a clear 
differential effect at home. Loosing the colonies put in motion a society-wide process of 
soul searching that carried profound political consequences, and created the ideal 
framework of political nationalism and economic autarky. 
v - The political consequences oí the Disaster 
In addition to its merely commercial aspects, European irnperialism at the end of 
the century had important military and political consequences for the peripheral 
countries of Europe. Italy started its incursions into the Dodecanese, Eritrea, Somalia, 
inability to compete in international markets. See Caries Sudriá, "La exportación ..._, cit., p. 378; J. Harrison, 
"Catalan Business and the Loss ofCuba. 1898-1914", Ihe Economic History Re\'ie\\", XXVII, n.3, August 1974, pp. 
345-346; Miquellzard, "El comerc catalá..._, cit., pp. 113-121. 
31 Pedro Fraile Balbín, IndustrializaciÓn \' grupos de presión. La economía política de la protecciÓn en España 
1900-1950, madrid: Alianza, 1991. 
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Abyssinia, Libya, and later the Balkans. After losing Brazil in 1822, Portugal started its 
African territorial expansion, and between the 1885 Berlin Conference and 1935, 
acquired the recognition of its sovereignty over more than two million square 
kilometers. Similarly, after its independence in (1821-1828), Greece acquired through 
wars and diplomatic pressures the lonian islands (1864), Thessaly and part of Epirus 
(1881), Macedonia, Crete, west, and later east, Thrace (1920), and practically aH the 
Aegean islands, and even invaded Turkey--reaching near Ankara in 1921.32 
Only the two large colonial po\vers at both ends of the Mediterranean--Spain and 
Turkey--suffered territoriallosses from their colonial empires at the turn of the century. 
In the Spanish case, the attempts to recover their Latin American possessions and to 
establish new colonies in Africa were not enough to alleviate tlthe Disastertl .33 As for 
Turkey, the territorial losses started at the end of the XVIlIth century and resulted in 
military conflicts with all its neighbors, and even with France and Britain. Throughout 
the nineteenth century up to the Great War, the Turkish tldisaster" resulted in the loss of 
the Balkans, Greece, Crimea, Egypt, the Middle East, and Northern Africa. 
The implications of these t\\"O processes were of great importance for both 
countries' economic development in subsequent years. Regardless of the direct impact 
of the colonial emancipation on Spain's foreign transactions, the political impact was of 
such magnitude, that loosing its empire--or what was left of it--shaped the policy 
making for a long time afterwards. The trend towards economic nationalism--specially 
through tariff protection--found in the political climate created by "the Disaster" one of 
its most solid justifications. 
From the Young Turks to Kemalism and its Six Arrows program of étatism and 
economic nationalism, the Turkish movement of "defensive modernization" was the 
reaction to the loss of territorial hegemony and capitulations.3~ The Spanish Disaster 
also had deep political consequences, which in turn created a path towards economic 
nationalism and autarky. Modern political analysis of nationalism assigns military 
defeat a central role in the development of national movements. Like economic 
32 Nicholas V. Gianaris. The Economies ofthe Balkan Countries, Ne\\' York: Praeger, 1982, pp. 36-37. 
33 Attempts at regaining colonial control \\'ere made in Chile and Peru in 1866-68. An expedition \\'as sent to 
Indochina in 1860, and to Mexico in 1862. The expansiona!')' movement in Marocco started at least \\'ith the \\'ar 
of 1859-60 and continued \\'ell in to the t\\'entieth centu!')' (1921-25). Even Portugal became an object of interest 
for unification and expansion in the so called [berían Movemenl that started after the Napoleonic \\'ars. See losé 
Antonio Rocamora, El nacionalismo ibérico 1792-1936, Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1994. 
3~ Mustafa Kemal's regeneration program during the 1920s and 1930s \\'as based on six proclaimed principies: 
étatism, nationalism. populism. secularism, revolutionism and republicanismo See, Paul Dumont. "The Origins 
of Kemalist Ideology" in 1.M. Landau, (ed.), AtatOrk and the Modemizatjon of Turkev, Boulder, Co.: 
Westvie\\', 1984, pp. 25-44; Dank\\'art A. Rusto\\', "The Modernization ofTurkey in Historica) and Comparati\'e 
Perspective" in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), Social Change and Politics in Turke\': A Structural-Historical Anal\'sis. 
Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1973, pp. 100-10 1; Nicholas V. Gianaris, The Economies ofthe Balkan Countries, New York: 
Praeger, 1982, pp. 43-44. 
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exploitation, or the denial of cultural individuality, rnilitary defeat rnay be one of the 
rnost powerful affronts felt by the elite in charge of defining (inventing) national 
identity. Defeat at the hands of a foreign arrny becornes a powerful excuse and a basic 
reference for identifying the enerny and setting the lirnits of national irnage. This helps 
not only to sanctify the nation and the national project, but also to enhance the 
nationalist sentirnents and to cernent the state's central place as the project's leader. 
Recent research on nationalisrn indicates that this \Vas the case of Spain after the war of 
1898.35 Spanish rnodem nationalisrn had already started half a century ago based on the 
"invention" of the war and victory against the 1808 Napoleonic invasion,'6 so that the 
Spanish-Arnerican conflict put an abrupt and bitter end to a period of national rnyth-
rnaking. The public perception of the defeat in the 1898 Spanish-Arnerican War was 
that of a profound and far-reaching failure. The long historiography on the Disaster 
shows a firm consensus on the deep crisis that loosing the last colonies meant, and on 
the pessimism it induced about Spain's economic conditions.37 Journalists, \\Titers, 
intellectuals, politicians and, of course, the military, all cornbined to create an 
atmosphere of disproportionate national frustration that had not had any previous 
equivalent, even when Spain lost the bulk of its four centuries old empire eighty years 
before.38 While loosing the mainland colonies in the 1820s \Vas perceived as "a loss of 
the King's territories", the loss of 1898--a mere 2 percent of \vhat had been the large 
Spanish Empire's territory--was taken as "our 0\\"11 collective failure"39 by the nationalist 
elite. The Spanish intelligentsia, and the middle class "became suddenly aware of the 
35 José Ah'arez Junco. "Elites y nacionalismo español", Política \' Sociedad, vol. XVIII, 1995, pp. 93-105. 
36 José Alvarez Junco, "La invención de la Guerra de la Independencia", Stvdia Historica. XII, 1994. pp. 75-99, The 
debate on the origins of Spanish modern nationalism is focused on the notion of the need of a ",ide popular 
political movement that in Spain did not exist. See Andrés de Bias Guerrero, Sobre el nacionalismo español, 
tvladrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales. 1989; Andrés de BIas Guerrero. Tradición republicana \' 
nacionalismo español( 1876-1930), tvladrid: Tecnos. 1991; Andrés de Bias Guerrero. Nacionalismos v naciones 
en Europa. tvladrid: Alianza. 199·l, Andrés de BIas Guerrero. Enciclopedia del Nacionalismo, Madrid: Tecnos. 
1977; Stanley G. Payne. "Spanish Nationalism in the T",entieth Century". The Re\'ie'" of Politics, XXVI, 1964, 
n. 3, pp. 403-422; Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, "Center and Periphery 1900-1936: National Integration and 
Regional Nationalisms Reconsidered" in Francis Lannon and Paul Preston (eds.), Elites and PQ",er in T"'entieth 
Centur\' Spain, Essa\'s in Honour of Sir Ra\'mond Carr, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 33-34; José María 
Jover Zamora, "Prólogo", La Era Isabelina v el Sexenio Democr ático (1834-1874). Madrid: Espasa Cal pe, 
1981, pp. VII-CLXII; José María Jover Zamora, "Caracteres del nacionalismo español, 1854-1874", Actas dd 
Simposio sobre posibilidades v límites de una historiografia nacional, Madrid, 1983, pp. 355-374. 
37 Carlos Serrano, "Aspectos ideológicos del conflicto cubano", en Emilio de Diego (ed.), 1895: La guerra en Cuba \' 
la España de la Restauración, Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1996, pp. 73-87. 
38 Jesús Rivera Córdoba, "La sociedad española durante la última guerra colonial", Tiempo de Historia, IV, 1978, 
pp. 48-59; Manuel Tuñón de Lara, "Los últimos días de un imperio", Historia 16, 11I, 1978, n, 27, pp. 70-80; 
José Luis Abellán. "La guerra de Cuba y los intekctuales", Historia 16, 11I, 1978, n. 27, pp. 90-95; Luis de Llera 
Esteban and Milagrosa Romero Samper, "Los intelectuales españoles y el problema colonial", in Emilio de 
Diego, cit, pp. 263-295; 
39 José Alvarez Junco, "El nacionalismo español como mito movilizador", in R. Cruz and M. Pérez Ledesma (eds.). 
Cultura v movilizaciÓn en la España contemporánea, Madrid: Alianza Universidad (forthcoming). 
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country's backwardness"40 and set out to put a remedy to it through national economic 
regeneration. 
The Disaster contributed to enhance the sense of both economic failure and 
urgency of reform, and this gave \Vay to the ideas of a necessary nostrification of the 
Spanish economy as a remedy for backwardness. The nationalist path for progress \Vas 
formulated by the regeneration \\Titers, who as a consequence of the 1898 colonial 
defeat, found a further motive to nationalize the domestic market. The central figure of 
the regeneration movement, Ramiro de Maeztu, saw it in these terms: 
The loss of our colonial markets makes clear how shallow and peripheral our economic evolution 
is...h is pointless for Biscay to produce iron and Catalonia to "'eave textiles...For these 
manufactures to take root on sol id ground "'e would need no'" that our national nucleus, our 
granary, the Castillian plateau, "'ould become an ample market with enough consumption 
41 power. 
The national market, however, \Vas small and lacked enough purchasing power to 
support domestic manufacturing in competition with foreign suppliers. A period of 
isolation was deemed necessary for the development of economies of scale and 
competitive ability in mature industrial (and also agricultural) sectors. Failure and 
urgency, then, combined to accelerate the trend to\vards autarky that characterized the 
twentieth century Spanish economy. This drift toward radical autarky had, of course, 
been started before, but it owed much of its strength to the climate of nationalism 
created by the loss of international status as a colonial power. The exaggerated 
perception of failure and urgency created a favorable environment for rent-seekers, 
some of them with sincere patriotic intentions. In addition to the groups directly 
affected by the loss of privileges, large social groups of the middle class that had not 
profited from the colonies felt their patriotic pride wounded, and channeled their 
frustration by blaming the State for the treason and dishonor imposed on Spain. Their 
rebellion found its best expression in the Producer committees (asambleas de 
productores), the chambers of commerce and agriculture, and an endless number of 
associations of farmers, merchants and small manufacturers that adopted regeneration, 
e.i., economic nationalism, as their central goa1.42 
Tariff protection and other means of isolation from foreign competition were, of 
course, old hat in the Spanish tradition. The tariffs of 1849, 1877, and specially 1892, 
made Spain one of Europe's most protected markets many years before loosing the last 
401. Alvarez Junco, "Elites.. ", cit., p. 103. The influential thinker Francisco Giner de los Ríos \\"rote at that moment: 
"Spain is no\\' the land \\"here all spiritual and material misery is settled" (cited in Juan López-Mori1las, 
"Francisco Giner: de la Setembrina al Desastre", Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, January 1980, n. 355, p. 21. 
41 Ramiro de Maeztu, Hacia otra Espal'\a. Madrid: Rialp, 1967 [1899], p. 102. 
42 Carlos Seco Serrano, "1898, España en cuestión", Estudios de Historia Social, n. 44/47, January-December 1988, 
pp.387-393. 
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colonies. In addition, the return to tariff protection \Vas common in all Europe. But in 
the Spanish case, the regeneration movement that pervaded the country at the turn of the 
century accelerated protectionism to a degree higher than in any other European 
economy.43 Regardless of the economic losses for the country as a whole or for the two 
main sectors involved in colonial trade, the groups representing the colonial interests--
notably wheat growers and textile producers--organized themselves into pO\verful 
lobbies44 that found an irrefutable excuse and a favorable nationalistic framework to 
achieve unparalleled tariff protection. We could conclude, therefore, that the loss of 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines \vas, indeed, a disaster for the Spanish 
economy, but not necessarily due to the direct impact of loosing the captive colonial 
markets, but rather for the economic nationalism that, as an indirect consequence, was 
imposed in Spain during most ofthe rest ofthe twentieth century. 
43 Heinrich Liepmann, Tariff Le\'els and the Economic Unit\' of Europe, London: George Alen & Unwin, 1938, pp. 
383-398; for a more accurate estimate of Spain's differential protection le\'els see, Antonio Tena, Protección \' 
crecimiento en la España de la Restauración, 1870-1930 (forthcoming). 
44 José Yarela Ortega, "El proteccionismo de los trigueros castellanos y la naturaleza del poder político en la 
Restauración", Cuadernos Económicos de ICE, n. 6, 1978, pp. 7-60; and Pedro Fraile Balbín, Industrialización \' 
Grupos de Presión, Madrid: Alianza, 1991. 
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Appendix A: Econometric l\1ethodology 
In this appendix we briet1y review the main time series concepts that are needed to define the 
four different types of outliers used in this paper and to define the measures used for the impact (size) 
and the temporal effects (duration) ofthe outliers. 
Remember, from equation (1) of the text, that oz(t) is the observed variable and that z(t) is the 
same variable but outlier corrected, that is z(t) =oz(t) - outlier(t). 
The outlier corrected series z(t) can usually be represented by an autoregressive, integrated, 
moving average model, ARIMA(p, l ,q), like 
4>(8) f1{z(t)-~} = 8(8) E(t) (A.I) 
where M(t) = z(t)- z(t-I) is the first difference of the series z(t), E(t) is a sequence of independent, 
identically distributed, Normal variables with mean °and constant variance (white noise or innovations). 
8 is the lag operator, so that 8 kz(t) = z(t-k), and the polynomials 4>(8) and 8(8) are polynomials in 8 of 
order p and q. In particular the autoregressive polynomial of order p, AR(p), is 4>(8) = 1 + 4> 18 + ... + 
4> p8P and the moving average polynomial of order q. MA(q), is 8 (8) = I + 8 18+ oo. + 8q8q. In practice 
with annual data the order of the autoregressive polynomials p and the order of the moving average 
polynomials q are usually lower or equal to 2. In our case p was always equal to 0, AR(O), and q \Vas 
always equal to 1, MA( 1), but in the case of exports that was equal to 2, MA(2). Therefore the t\Vo types 
of estimated models of Table 2 are: an ARIMA(O, 1, 1) which can be written as, 
f1{z(t)-~} = E(t) + 81 E(t-I) (A.2) 
and an ARIMA(O, I,2) model, 
f1{z(t)-~} = E(t) + 8IE(t-l) + 82E(t-2). (A.3) 
The ARIMA(p,d,q) representation is very general and can give good approximations to most of 
macroeconomic variables expressed in real and monetary terms when d is equal to I or 2. Furthermore, 
equations (1) and (A.l) to (A.3) allow us to incorporate the four different types of outliers previously 
mentioned4S • 
Let It(T) be a dummy mriable defined as It(T) = {I if t = T and °if t '1= T}. That is It(T) is a 
variable which is always equal to °except for the year T, \Vhere the year T can be any year from 1850 to 
4S This is implemented by sing the program TRAMO ofGómez V. and Maravall A. (1996) "Time series regressions 
with ARIMA noise, missing observations and outliers". D.T. 8anco de Espana, # 9628. 
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1914. For example, if a "disaster" occurred in aggregate economic variables in 1898 we should be able to 
identify T with the year 1898. 
Definilion 1: 'nnovation outlier (10) 
The outlier(t) is an innovation outlier at time T if it can be represented by, 
outlier(T) = w {8(B)1 ~(B) ~ }'t(T) (AA) 
where w is the constant that measure the si:e of lhe impacl and the Iagged polynomial {8(B)/~(B)~}
 
measure the duralion of lhe impacl of the outlier at time T on the variable oz(t). Notice that when w=O, 
there is no outlier effect and therefore this is the hypothesis we are testing in Table 2 by reporting the t-
ratio of w. The name "innovation" outlier comes from the fact the its effects on oz(t) are transmitted 
through the innovations g(t) of model (A.l). 
Definilion 2: Additive olltlier (AO) 
The outlier(t) is an additive outlier at time T if it can be represented by, 
outlier(T) = w It(T) (A.S) 
where w is the constant that measure the si:e of lhe ímpacl of the outlier at time Ton the variable oz(t). 
Notice that no", the outlier at time T has an inslanlaneous impacl affecting, oz(t), only at time t = T but 
not during the rest of the years. 
Definilion 3: Temporal change (TC) 
The outlier(t) represents a temporal change at time T if it can be represented by, 
outlier(T) = '" {II M} 't(T) (A.6) 
where w is the constant tl1at measure the si:e of lhe impacl and the lagged polynomial {I 1 <5~} measure 
the duralion of lhe ímpacl of the outlier at time T on the variable oz(t). Usually <5 is egual to 0.7 which 
means that the outlier at time T has an impact with effects that last several periods in the future (duration) 
and the sizes of the impacts on oz(t) decreases exponentially through time (transitory effect). 
Definilion 4: Level shift (LS) 
The outlier(t) represents a level shift at time T if it can be represented by, 
outlier(T) = w {I 1~} It(T) (A.7) 
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where w is the constant that measure the si:e ofthe impact and the lagged polynomial {l! 6} measure the 
duration ofthe impact of the outlier at time Ton the variable oz(t). Notice that now the outlier at time T 
has a permanent impact affecting, oz(t), not only at time t = T but during the rest of the years 
(permanent effect). 
Once \Ve have the estimated ARIMA model for the series z(t) \Ve would Iike to decompose the 
observed series in three different unobserved components46 : the trend, the business cycle and the 
irregular component, 
oz(t) = trend(t) + cycle(t) + irregular(t). (A.8) 
This decomposition is interesting because we can associate and measure the impact of the 
ourliers on the different components. This property is very important since the economic and policy 
implications of outliers are different contingent on affecting the trend (permanent component), the 
business cycle (transitory component) or the irregular component (innovations). 
Appendix B: The Data 
OEXPORT is defined as exports (f.o.b) in constant 1913 prices in millions of pesetas (Antonio 
Tena, "Comercio exterior", in Albert Carreras (ed), Estadísticas Históricas de España. Siglos XIX \' XX, 
Madrid: Fundación Banco Exterior, 1989, pp. 340-343). 
ORGDPPOP is the real gross domestic product per capita at 1980 constant pesetas (L. Prados de 
la Escosura, "Spains's gross domestic product ... ", cit, pp 101-102). 
OBANKING is an index ofbank deposits (1958=100) (ibid pp 77-78). 
OCCBAL is the current account balances in millions ofpesetas (ibid). 
CCBALM is defined as the current account balances plus (minus) changes in gold and silver 
reserves in millions of pesetas (ibid and Juan Hemández Andreu Historia Monetaria y Financiera de 
Espai'la, Madrid: Síntesis, 1996, pp.239-241). 
FOOD is a manufacturing index offood products, 1958= 100 (L. Prados de la Escosura, "Spain's Gross 
Domestic product ...", cil. pp. 71-72). 
OTEXTlLES is a manufacturing index oftextile products 1958=100 (ibid pp. 71-72). 
The temlinology used in the text, in Figures 2 to 7 and in Tables 2 and 3 is the following: 
46 The unobserved components models are obtained using the program SEATS of Gómez V.and Maravall A. (1996) 
"Signal extraction in ARIMA time series". D.T. Banco de España, # 9628. 
23 
Consider the variable EXPORT where we have found sorne outliers and we have decomposed 
the series in three components: trend, business cycle and irregular. When outliers are found, the original 
series is identified by the name of the series but adding an O at the beginning of the name, meaning 
obser\'ed series, oz(t), and the series corrected for outliers by the name of the series without beginning 
by an o, z(t). Example, oz(t) = OEXPORT = Observed EXPORT series with outliers, and z(t)= EXPORT 
series corrected for outliers (free of outliers). 
The trend component of the series is identified by the name of the series but adding a T at the 
end ofthe name, meaning Trend. Example, EXPORTT = Trend component ofEXPORT. 
The business cycle component is identified by the name ofthe series but adding a C at the end 
ofthe name, meaning Cycle. Example, EXPORTC = Business cycle component ofEXPORT. 
The irregular component of the series is identified by the name of the series but adding an I at 
the end ofthe name, meaning Irregular. Example, EXPORTI = Irregular component ofEXPORT. 
24 
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Figure 1 
Spanish sales to colonial m8í'l(ets as a pel'centage of e11 expol'ts, 1850-1900. 
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Figure 3: Unobserved Components in BANKING 
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Figure 5: Unobserved Components in CCBAL (1851-1914) 
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Figure 7: Unobserved Compdnents in OEXPORT 
1400.,....---------_--__-., 
1200 
I-EXPORTTI 
1000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
O+n-I'TTT'1I'TTT'1"TTTTTTTTTTTT"l'TTT'1rTTT'1"TTTTTTTTT'!TTTTTT"l'TTT'1rTTT'1TTTTm 
50 60 70 80 90 00 10 
Figure 7a: Trend Component 
150 -r---------___..,._----___., 
1- EXPORTCI 
100 
Figure 7b: Business Cyc\e Component 
100~--------_----___., 
O 
-100 
-200 1- EXPORTII 
-300 
-400 
-500 
-600 """'"T'TTTTTTT"l"M'T""TTTTTTT'T"I'TT"I"'TTTTTTI"T"I'TTtT"""""T'TT'l'rTTTT"T'M'TTTT""'i 
50 60 70 80 90 00 10 
Figure 7c: Iregular + AO Outlier 
Figure 8 
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